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Structural Transformation, the Mismeasurement of 
Productivity Growth, and the Cost Disease of Services †
By Alwyn Young *
If workers self-select into industries based upon their relative 
productivity in different tasks, and comparative advantage is aligned 
with absolute advantage, then the average efficacy of a sector’s 
workforce will be negatively correlated with its employment share. 
This might explain the difference in the reported productivity 
growth of contracting goods and expanding services. Instrumenting 
with defense expenditures, I find the elasticity of worker efficacy 
with respect to employment shares is substantially negative, albeit 
estimated imprecisely. The estimates suggest that the view that goods 
and services have similar productivity growth rates is a plausible 
alternative characterization of growth in developed economies. (JEL E23, E24, H56, J24, O41, O47)
One of the strongest and seemingly most accurate characterizations of the process 
and problems of growth in advanced economies is William Baumol’s “Cost Disease 
of Services.” Baumol’s argument, begun in papers as early as 1965 and continuing 
to this very day (e.g., Baumol and Bowen 1965; Baumol 1967; Baumol, Blackman, 
and Wolff 1985; and Baumol 2012), starts from the premise that productivity growth 
is inherently more difficult to achieve in the production of services than in the pro-
duction of goods. With the two industries competing for factors of production in 
the same factor markets, the relative cost of producing  service output inevitably 
rises. If the demand for services was income inelastic and price elastic, these trends 
would not pose a problem, as the share of services in nominal GDP (gross domes-
tic product) would decline. Alas, precisely the opposite is true, and services gar-
ner an increasing share of nominal output. Aggregate productivity growth, equal to 
the nominal output share weighted average of sectoral productivity growths, must 
decline steadily.1
Decades of data on productivity growth in goods and services have confirmed 
Baumol’s thesis, turning it, for all intents and purposes, into a stylized fact of 
economic growth. Productivity statistics, however, are based on the fundamental 
1 Although not mentioned in the papers cited above, implicit in Baumol’s argument is the notion that service out-
put is relatively nontradeable. Otherwise, low productivity growth in services could be met, at least at the individual 
country level, by exporting more manufactures for services.
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assumption that each new worker is qualitatively the same as every old worker.2 If 
workers self-select into industries based upon unobservables, this assumption may 
create a systematic bias, as the type of workers present when an industry is small 
may not be the same as when the industry becomes large, and vice versa.
In his “Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,” Roy (1951) identified the 
mechanism central to this paper. Workers select the industry in which they have the 
highest relative productivity (i.e., a comparative advantage). If individual productiv-
ity in different tasks is uncorrelated or at worst weakly correlated, then individuals 
having a comparative advantage in an industry will on average also have an absolute 
advantage in that sector. As a sector expands by offering higher wages to prospec-
tive workers elsewhere in the economy, it will draw in individuals with both a lower 
comparative advantage and a lower absolute advantage in the sector, while leav-
ing individuals with the highest comparative and absolute advantage in competing 
 sectors. Consequently, productivity in expanding sectors will appear to decline and 
productivity in contracting sectors will appear to rise. In sum, in a Roy world the 
apparent disparity in the productivity growth of goods and services may come about 
because services expand by drawing in people who are, as examples, less adept at 
finance, law, and medicine, while goods sectors contract by shedding the least able 
farmers, manufacturers, and miners—all of which is not taken into account in mea-
sures of productivity growth. Underlying true levels of productivity growth—i.e., 
taking into account the average efficacy of the workers present in the two sectors—
might not be all that different.
Figure 1, which graphs the relative supply and demand for services, summarizes 
the argument made in this paper. Baumol’s supply curve is essentially a horizontal 
line, determined by the relative productivity of the two sectors.3 As goods experience 
more rapid productivity growth, this supply curve shifts up, from  S 0 
Baumol to  S 1 
Baumol , 
exemplifying the cost disease of services. At the same time, as a consequence of 
the relatively higher income elasticity of demand for services, the relative demand 
curve shifts out from  D 0 to  D 1 . The equilibrium moves from  E 0 to  E 1 , with a higher 
relative output and price of services, which has consequently a growing nominal 
share of the economy. An alternative hypothesis, however, is that the supply curve 
is substantially upward-sloping because of the correlation between comparative and 
absolute advantage Roy describes. As drawn in the figure, the Roy supply curve  S  Roy 
intersects both  E 0 and  E 1 . This describes a situation in which productivity growth is 
the same in both sectors, so the supply curve does not shift, but the relative demand 
curve shifts out as incomes rise. Here the rise in the relative price of services is 
driven purely by the changing efficacy of the average worker in each sector.4
2 To be sure, more sophisticated analyses divide workers into categories based upon observable determinants 
of human capital such as age and education, but within each category the assumption is ultimately made that all 
workers are identical.
3 If the capital income shares (i.e., factor intensities) of the two sectors differ, the supply curve will be upward 
sloping even without the effects Roy describes. However, as discussed in the online Appendix, empirically the capi-
tal income shares of goods and services in the US economy are almost identical and the upward slope in the supply 
curve attributable to this effect is negligible: i.e., an increase in relative prices of 0.4 of 1 percent as relative output 
goes from 0 to ∞. In the sources cited above, Baumol and his coauthors don’t emphasize a relative price effect 
emanating from relative factor intensities and, in this regard, appear to be completely correct.
4 As Figure 1 makes clear, for Baumol’s argument it does not matter whether or not the relative real output of 
services is rising (only that its nominal share is increasing), but for the Roy argument it does. Baumol, Blackman, 
and Wolff (1985) argue that there is no change in the relative output of goods and services. This is actually 
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Figure 1 makes clear that the Roy model does not deny the rise in the relative price 
of services, it merely explains it with a different mechanism. Figure 2 illustrates 
why this matters. Panel A draws the linear production possibilities frontier implied 
by the Baumol model, which rotates out as goods experience more rapid productiv-
ity growth.5 Panel B draws the Roy production possibilities frontier, which shifts 
out uniformly when productivity growth is identical in both sectors. This panel 
shows that the same equilibrium price and quantity relations can be explained with 
equiproportional shifts of the intercepts of the production possibility frontier and a 
movement along its concave surface. For the purposes of heuristically illustrating 
welfare implications, the diagrams also include social indifference curves which, 
under the assumption of competitive markets, are tangent to the production possibil-
ities frontiers. Aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) growth is the proportional 
increase in the length of the ray from the origin to the tangent line on the production 
frontier (ΔV/V in the figure).6 In the Baumol model, as the share of services in total 
not true. As discussed in Section II, US and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
data clearly indicate a large rise in the relative real output of services in the postwar era.
5 For the purposes of this expositional diagram, I assume that factor supplies are constant.
6 To see this, note that if inputs are constant (as assumed in the diagram), we can describe the problem of maxi-
mizing GDP as one of maximizing  P x X +  P Y Y s.t. 0 ≥ F(X, Y, t). Differentiating the binding production possibili-
ties constraint, we have (a) FX dX + FY  dY + Ft  dt = 0. Rearranging and making use of the first order conditions 
from the maximization problem (λ F X =  P X , etc), one finds that:
 g TFP = −λ F t /GDP =  θ X  g x +  θ Y  g Y ,
where λ is the value of relaxing the PPF (production-possibility frontier) constraint,  θ i the GDP share of product 
i, and gi the growth of the output of i. Thus, total factor productivity growth, the proportionate value of the time 
trend relaxation of the PPF constraint, equals the GDP share weighted increase of the output of each product. (a) 
in the paragraph above, however, holds whether the dX and dY are the observed values or imposed values such that 
dX = g × X and dY = g × Y. Thus, regardless of the bias of TFP growth, one can equally say that gTFP =  θ X g + θ Y g = g. g is the proportionate increase in the length of the vector (with slope determined by the current production 
bundle) from the origin to the production possibilities frontier.
S Roy
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Figure 1. Alternative Views of Relative Supply
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expenditure grows, the growth rate of this vector slows. In the Roy model, the pro-
portional growth rate remains constant. Over time there is a growing discrepancy in 
the instantaneous rate of welfare growth predicted by the two models.
This paper draws its inspiration from recent interest in the macro-implications 
of Roy’s model. Lagakos and Waugh (2011) argue that selection effects of the type 
described in this paper can explain the greater relative productivity of agricultural 
workers to nonagricultural workers in countries with larger nonagricultural sectors. 
Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow (2012) calculate the inefficiency associated with 
the historical concentration of women and African Americans in particular occupa-
tions using a Roy model, and argue that the gradual elimination of barriers to the 
participation of these groups in other occupations can explain as much as one-fifth 
of postwar US aggregate wage growth. Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), indepen-
dent of this paper, argue that the decrease of manufacturing output brought about 
by the appreciation of the real exchange rate associated with resource windfalls 
generates a spurious rise in manufacturing productivity as the contraction of the sec-
tor leaves only the most productive workers behind. This paper extends these Roy-
related analyses to the general consideration of the relative productivity of goods 
and services. Along the way, I establish the theoretical bias in conventional mea-
sures of sectoral productivity and clarify the mathematical conditions necessary for 
Roy effects to be present (i.e., for average worker efficacy to be declining in a sec-
tor’s employment share). While the papers above calibrate their models, this paper 
estimates the size of Roy effects using regression techniques.
There has been limited prior research with regards to estimating empirically the 
elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to the sectoral employment share, 
the key parameter in the macro-implementation of the Roy model. Heckman and 
Sedlacek (1985), using CPS (Current Population Survey) microdata and instru-
mental variables, find that the local elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to the 
employment share is around −0.5 for manufactures and −1 for nonmanufactures 
(see their Table 3). This brackets roughly the range of estimates found in this paper. 
PPF
0
PPF
0
Panel A. Baumol Panel B. Roy 
V V 
∆V ∆V
PPF
1
PPF
1
Q
G
Q
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S
Figure 2. Welfare Implications with the Same Equilibrium Prices and Quantities 
(TFP growth = ∆V/V)
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McLaughlin and Bils (2001) find milder effects, using PSID (Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics) microdata to show that the wages of entrants or leavers are 6 to 17 per-
cent lower than those of continuing workers. However, as discussed in the online 
Appendix, the PSID data used in that paper concern mostly simultaneous entry and 
exit (a form of employment churning) and are uncorrelated with changes in sectoral 
employment shares. This paper focuses directly on the impact of changes in sectoral 
employment, using private sector employment changes driven by changes in mili-
tary spending to identify the elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to 
sectoral employment.
Zvi Griliches, in his AEA presidential address (1994) and earlier (1992), brought 
to the profession’s attention the shortcomings of US measures of service sector out-
put, such as those which extrapolated inputs, eliminating productivity growth by 
construction. Since his time, however, there have been vast improvements in the 
national income accounts measures of service sector activity, particularly in regards 
to the recent time period (1987–2010) which is the focus of this paper’s analy-
sis. Triplett and Bosworth (2004) provide a review of these developments and the 
problems which remain. This paper takes as given the official measures of sectoral 
output, focusing on the systematic bias brought about by the failure to consider the 
relation between employment shares and average worker efficacy.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin in Section I by presenting a simple Roy 
model, showing how the bias in sectoral measures of total factor productivity growth 
and the slope of the relative supply curve depend upon a key parameter: the elastic-
ity of average worker efficacy within a sector with respect to that sector’s share of 
total employment. Section I also shows how correlation between an individual’s 
productivity in different activities can eliminate the positive association between 
comparative advantage and absolute advantage, overturning Roy’s prediction that 
average worker efficacy is inversely related to a sector’s employment share. Thus, 
the relation between worker efficacy and sectoral employment depends upon the 
process generating individual productivity draws: i.e., it is ultimately something 
which needs to be estimated empirically rather than identified theoretically.
Section II presents industry-level evidence that the elasticity of worker efficacy 
with respect to sectoral employment is, indeed, substantially negative. Projecting 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics KLEMS7 measures for the United States private sec-
tor divided into 60 sectors, and the University of Groningen’s KLEMS measures for 
private sector activity in 18 OECD countries divided into 29 sectors, on a variety 
of instruments, I find that defense spending is the only instrument which robustly 
satisfies the dual requirements of first-stage significance and second-stage exogene-
ity (the exclusion restriction) necessary for two-stage least squares. Estimates of the 
long-run elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to the sectoral employment share 
range from −0.5 to −1, with most observations concentrated in the more negative 
half of this range. I also find that an elasticity of −0.75 equalizes goods and services 
productivity growth in the United States and the OECD at large. It produces a stable 
Roy supply curve which matches the historical US and OECD data on relative goods 
and services price and quantity growth, as heuristically illustrated in Figure 1 above.
7 Capital (K ), labor (L), energy (E ), materials (M ), and purchased service inputs (S).
3640 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMBER 2014
Section III concludes the published paper. An online Appendix provides math-
ematical proofs of the theoretical claims made in Section II. While the BLS (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) adjusts its aggregate economy-wide measures of labor input 
growth for compositional effects, it does not do this in the sectoral KLEMS data-
base. The online Appendix also describes how I develop detailed sectoral measures 
of labor composition which I use to adjust the BLS measures of total factor produc-
tivity growth and the sectoral measures of changing employment shares. Finally, as 
mentioned above, the online Appendix provides a review of the PSID data used in 
the McLaughlin and Bils paper, showing that it concerns simultaneous entry and 
exit, rather than the overall expansion and contraction of sectoral employment, 
which is the focus of Roy’s model and this paper.
I. Structural Transformation and the Mismeasurement of Productivity
In this section I present the main theoretical results of the paper. Throughout the 
analysis I focus on supply relations alone, leaving the general equilibrium closure 
of the model with preferences and demand unspecified. This is both because I do 
not want to take a stand on the nature of preferences and demand (including trade), 
and because it is unnecessary to do so. All of the implications of the Roy model can 
be understood in terms of the supply curve and all of the theoretical analysis can 
be understood in terms of movements along that curve, movements whose causes, 
while obviously related to demand, do not need to be specified. To focus on intu-
ition, I confine the mathematical proofs of the claims made in this section to the 
online Appendix.
A. A Simple Model
Consider an economy with two perfectly competitive industries, goods (G) and 
services (S). Value added in industry i (= G or S) is produced with capital and labor
(1)  Q i =  A i  F i  ( K i ,  ∫ u∈Se t i     z i (u) ) ,
where Se t i is the set of workers u laboring in industry i and  z i (u) is the efficacy or 
productivity of individual u when working in industry i. Each worker is endowed 
with a pair of industry productivities ( z G ,  z S ) which is drawn from some joint cumu-
lative distribution function G( z G ,  z S ).
Workers move to the industry providing the highest financial reward. Thus, with 
w i denoting the wage per unit of effective labor offered in industry i, the set of indi-
viduals choosing to work in that sector is given by
(2)  Se t i =  { u |  w i  z i (u) >  w j  z j (u) } ,
where j is the sectoral complement of i. Define  π i as the probability a worker selects 
industry i or, equivalently, the share of the labor force in industry i. With L denot-
ing the total labor force,  L i , the number of workers in industry i equals  π i L. For a 
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given distribution of ( z G ,  z S ) draws,  π i is determined in a general equilibrium which 
includes a specification of demand, with d π i /dω > 0, where ω =  w i / w j .
Define the expected efficacy of a worker in sector i (i.e., their productivity condi-
tional on working in that sector) as
(3)  _ z i = E ( z i (u) | u ∈ Se t i ) =  
 ∫ 
u∈Se t i     z i (u) du  _  ∫ 
u∈Se t i    du
  =  
 ∫ 
u∈Se t i     z i (u) du  _
L ×  π i   .
As proven in the online Appendix, regardless of the distribution function generating 
the paired draws ( z G ,  z S ), the elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to the 
sectoral employment share is greater than −1:
(4) ξ =  d  
_ z i  _
d  π i  
 π i  _ _ z i > −1.
From (3), we see that if we ignore the numerator the elasticity of  _ z i with respect to π i is −1. The numerator, however, is increasing in  π i , as anything which increases 
the total number of workers will increase the cumulative sum of their productivi-
ties. Consequently, the overall elasticity of  
_ z i with respect to  π i will be greater than −1 (examples for particular functional forms are provided in the online Appendix). 
None of the empirical estimates presented later in Section II reject this prediction. 
While ξ may be positive or negative, Roy (1951), as explained in the introduction, 
argued that it should be negative: i.e., average worker efficacy declines as a sector 
expands and draws in less productive workers. For the moment, I will assume this 
to be true.
Aggregate labor input in an industry is a product of the number of workers times 
the average efficacy per worker, so the production function is usefully reexpressed 
as
(5)  Q i =  A i  F i ( K i ,  L i  _ z i ) .
From this, we see that total factor productivity growth, calculated properly, is given 
by8
(6)   Ai (true) =   Q i −  Θ Ki   Ki −  Θ Li (  Li +   _ z i ),
where a ^ denotes a proportional change and  Θ Ki and  Θ Li are the factor income 
shares of capital and labor in sector i, respectively. Unfortunately, in estimating total 
8 The derivation is the usual one for total factor productivity calculations. With perfect competition the capital 
rental and wage per unit of effective labor equal the value marginal product of each factor, so the elasticity of the 
production function with respect to each factor equals the factor income share.
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factor productivity growth, growth accountants treat each new worker as the equiva-
lent of existing workers,9 estimating total factor productivity growth to be
(7)   Ai (est) =   Q i −  Θ Ki   Ki −  Θ Li   Li =   Ai (true) +  Θ Li   _ z i 
 =   Ai (true) + ξ Θ Li   πi .
If average worker efficacy depends inversely on a sector’s share of the labor force 
(ξ < 0), growth accountants will systematically overestimate productivity growth in 
sectors whose labor share is contracting, such as goods industries, and systemati-
cally underestimate it in sectors whose labor share is expanding, such as services.
With the addition of two empirical assumptions it is possible to derive a simple 
expression for the goods and services relative supply curve. These assumptions, 
although not universal characteristics of the model, approximately characterize the 
US and OECD economies (see end of Section II below): (i) average wages per 
worker are proportional across sectors; and (ii) factor income shares are the same in 
the two sectors. Mathematically, these amount to
(8)  W G =  w G  _ z G ∝  w S  _ z S =  W S and  r K G  _  W G  L G =  
r K S  _  W S  L S ,
 so   wG −   wS =   _ zS −   _ zG and   KG −   LG =   KS −   LS ,
where r is the common rental per unit of capital. Although the marginal worker 
is indifferent between working in the two sectors, average earnings per worker, 
 W i =  w i  _ z i , depend on the inframarginal distribution of heterogeneous efficacy and 
need not necessarily equalize.10 Thus (8) is an empirical assumption, rather than a 
theoretical prediction of the model.
Continuing, as  Q i =  A i  F i ( K i ,  L i  _ z i ) and  L i = L π i , we have
(9)   Q G −   Q S =   AG −   AS +  Θ K (  KG −   KS ) +  Θ L (  LG +   _ zG −   LS −   _ zS )
 =   AG −   AS + (  πG −   πS ) +  Θ L (  _ zG −   _ zS ) 
 =   AG −   AS + (1/ξ +  Θ L )(  _ zG −   _ zS ) .
9 A more refined practice is to differentiate workers into types based upon observable characteristics such as age 
and education. Within each type, however, marginal workers are treated as identical to average workers, producing 
the same problem, as I show when I extend the model further below.
10 For example, when the  z i are draws from independent fréchet distributions average wages by sector always 
equalize, but when they are draws from exponential distributions they do not (see the online Appendix).
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From the dual measure of productivity growth   Ai =  Θ K   r +  Θ L   wi −   Pi ,11 so
(10)   PS −   PG =  Θ L (  wS −   wG ) + (  AG −   AS )
 =  Θ L (  _ zG −   _ zS ) + (  AG −   AS ) .
Finally, substituting for   _ zG −   _ zS  using (9), we derive the Roy supply curve:
(11)   PS −   PG =  ( − Θ L ξ _ 1 +  Θ L ξ) (  Q S −   Q G ) +  ( 1 _ 1 +  Θ L ξ) (  AG −   AS )  [ Roy ] .
The first term on the right-hand side of (11) gives the slope of the supply curve; the 
second term gives the vertical shift associated with a change in relative total factor 
productivities. For 0 > ξ > −1, the supply curve is upward sloping, as drawn in 
Figure 1 of the introduction. In the special case where ξ = 0 and average worker pro-
ductivity does not vary with the sectoral employment share, labor is, for all intents 
and purposes, homogeneous and the supply curve reduces to
(12)   PS −   PG =   AG −   AS  [ Baumol ] .
With  P S / P G independent of  Q S / Q G , this is, of course, Baumol’s horizontal relative 
supply curve.
Equation (11) highlights the fact that, in the absence of differences in productivity 
growth rates, there is a limit to the relative price growth which can be explained by 
Roy’s model of self-selection. With the labor share of two-thirds observed in the US 
and OECD economies, as ξ goes from 0 to −1 the slope parameter − Θ L ξ/(1 +  Θ L ξ) 
goes from 0 to 2. Thus, the Roy supply curve can be no steeper than 2: i.e., the his-
torical growth of the relative output of services to goods has to be at least one-half 
the historical growth of the relative price if one wants to eliminate Baumol type 
effects from the story. As it so happens, the historical growth rates of relative goods 
and services outputs and prices in the United States and the OECD at large appear 
to be about equal (see Section II), which can be explained, in the absence of any dif-
ferences in productivity growth, with a ξ of −0.75. This value is comfortably within 
the range of long-run estimates using defense spending as an instrument reported 
later in Section II.
B. Comparative and Absolute Advantage and the Sign of ξ
In the online Appendix I prove that sufficient conditions for ξ, the elasticity of 
average worker efficacy with respect to a sector’s share of total employment, to 
be less than zero are that (i) the sectoral productivity draws  z i are independent of 
each other; and (ii) the elasticity of the cumulative distribution function for each 
of the draws, (dG/dz) × (z/G), is decreasing in the productivity of the draw. 
11 Totally differentiating  P i  Q i = r  K i +  w i  L i  _ z i :   Pi +   Q i =  Θ K (  r +   Ki ) +  Θ L (  wi +   Li +   _ z i ). Substituting 
for   Q i gives the equation in the text.
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The latter  characteristic is true of all of the popular distribution functions defined 
on  nonnegative numbers: i.e., the chi-squared, exponential, F, fréchet, gamma, 
 lognormal, pareto, rayleigh, uniform, and weibull distributions,12 so I relegate a dis-
cussion of its role to the online Appendix. The assumption of independence is more 
problematic, so I explore its role here with a simple example and diagram.
Consider a two-sector example where the draw for sector i is deterministically 
related to that of sector j by the equation  z i =  z j η , with  z j drawn from any distribution 
function. Workers will select sector i if  w i  z i >  w j  z j or, equivalently,  w i / w j >  z j 1−η . 
Figure 3 illustrates how the characteristics of the resulting equilibrium vary with η. 
Panel A considers the case where η < 0: i.e., the productivity draws are negatively 
correlated. The upper quadrant of the diagram shows that there exists a marginal 
draw  z j * such that all workers with draws greater than  z j * work in sector j and all 
workers with draws less than  z j * work in sector i. The productivity of workers in sec-
tor i is illustrated in the lower quadrant, where the axis, despite its location below 
the horizontal line, should be read as representing positive numbers. With η < 0, the 
productivity of workers in sector i is negatively related to the  z j draws.  
_ z j is given by 
the average of the workers to the right of  z j * , while  
_ z i is given by the average of the 
workers below (i.e., south of)  z i * =  z j *η . As  w i / w j increases, sector j sheds workers 
with less than the average productivity in that industry, while sector i gains workers 
with less than the average productivity in that sector. Average productivity rises in 
the sector losing workers and falls in the sector gaining workers, so ξ < 0.
12 While this condition may be true for all of the well-known distributions, I should note that it isn’t hard to think 
of distribution functions where it is not. Thus, the distribution function G(z) = (exp(z) − 1)/(exp(1) − 1) defined 
on [0, 1] violates the condition and, in a simple two sector example, produces regions where the average productiv-
ity of workers in a sector is rising in the sector’s share of total employment. I should also note that for the uniform 
distribution defined on [a, b], for a > 0 the elasticity of the cumulative distribution is decreasing strictly in z but for 
a = 0 it is constant and a weaker form of the theorem applies (ξ is nonpositive).
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Turning to panel B of the figure, we consider the case where the draws are posi-
tively correlated, so 1 > η > 0.13 With a positive relationship between  z i and  z j ,  _ z j is 
once again given by the average of the workers to the right of  z j * , but  
_ z i now equals 
the average of the workers above (i.e., north of)  z i * . As  w i / w j rises, industry j sheds 
workers with less than the average productivity in that sector, but industry i gains 
workers with more than its average sectoral productivity. ξ is still negative for sector 
j, but it is now positive for sector i.
Returning to the trade terminology used in the introduction of this paper, if there 
is a positive correlation between comparative advantage and absolute advantage, 
then marginal workers entering or exiting an industry will have less than the average 
sectoral productivity. If, however, the correlation between comparative and absolute 
advantage is negative, marginal workers will have more than the average productiv-
ity. In panel A of Figure 3, workers who choose to work in industry i or j (a con-
sequence of comparative advantage) are absolutely more productive in that sector 
than workers who choose to work in the other sector, so comparative advantage is 
positively correlated with absolute advantage. In panel B, this is true for sector j, but 
it is no longer true for sector i. In the case of sector i, workers who choose to work 
in the industry (those with  z i lying north of  z i * on the vertical axis) are absolutely 
less productive in that sector than those who choose to work elsewhere (those with 
z i lying south of  z i * on the vertical axis), so comparative advantage is negatively cor-
related with absolute advantage.
Roy argued that if a worker’s productivities in different sectors are independent of 
each other, then the marginal worker entering or exiting an industry will be less effi-
cient than the average worker in that sector. The theorem described above and proven 
in the online Appendix shows that, modulo a technical density condition, Roy’s con-
jecture is true. Figure 3 shows that positive correlation between an individual’s pro-
ductivity in different sectors undermines the association between comparative and 
absolute advantage, producing an indeterminate association between average and 
marginal productivities. In constructing total factor productivity growth estimates, 
as discussed shortly below, the growth accountant typically adjusts for observables 
such as age and education that create positive correlations in individual productivity 
across industries and tasks. These adjustments are, however, by no means exhaus-
tive and it remains an empirical question whether or not comparative advantage is 
positively or negatively correlated with absolute advantage. The empirical results of 
the next section, interpreted in the light of the Roy model, provide some evidence in 
favor of the view that the elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to a sec-
tor’s employment share is negative: i.e., that by and large comparative and absolute 
advantage are indeed positively correlated.
C. Practical Extensions
A modest amount of notational and algebraic complexity must be added to the 
model to bring it to the data. To this end, imagine that there are N sectors with gross 
13 For the case η > 1, rearrange  z i =  z j η as  z j =  z i 1/η , rename i as j and j as i and proceed with panel B.
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output in each sector i a function of J types of labor input and M types of other 
inputs:
(13)  Q i =  A i  F i ( ∫ u∈Se t i 1      z i 1 (u),  ∫ u∈Se t i 2     z i 2 (u) , … ,  ∫ u∈Se t i J     z i J (u),  M i 1 ,  M i 2 , … ,  M i M ) ,
where I now use superscripts to denote the type of input and subscripts the industry. 
The switch from value added to gross output reflects the fact that my data sources, 
the BLS and Groningen KLEMS, measure total factor productivity growth at the 
sectoral level, using the gross output concept, so the list of M additional inputs 
moves beyond capital and includes intermediate inputs such as materials, services, 
and energy. Good estimates of total factor productivity growth typically adjust for 
“labor quality” by decomposing labor into mutually exclusive categories based upon 
observable determinants of human capital such as sex, age, and education. This 
decomposition not only produces more accurate measures of total factor productiv-
ity growth, it also implicitly controls for factors that produce a positive correlation 
in individual productivity across tasks, as noted above.
While the Groningen KLEMS adjust for labor quality, the BLS KLEMS measures 
do not adjust for labor quality, using only total labor hours as the measure of labor 
input. Using Current Population Survey data, I have constructed measures of labor 
input for each of the 60 KLEMS sectors cross-classified by sex, age (six categories), 
and education (five categories). I follow a methodology very similar to that used by 
the BLS in producing its measures of labor quality for the aggregate economy, using 
the CPS data to determine the distribution of workers by characteristic, but bench-
marking the sectoral totals of hours and workers using the BLS Current Employment 
Statistics data. Details are provided in the online Appendix. I use these estimates to 
adjust the BLS TFP growth measures for the changing composition of the workforce 
and to calculate the changing shares of workers by characteristic, as in (15) below. 
The main results, however, can just as easily be found with the unadjusted BLS data, 
as reported in footnotes later.
To extend the model to this environment, let each worker of type j be endowed 
with a set of N industry productivities ( z  1 j ,  z  2 j , … ,  z  N j ) drawn from some joint 
distribution function and let  w  i j denote the wage per unit of effective labor of 
type j in industry i. A worker of type j chooses to work in sector i if  w i j z  i j(u) >  w  k j z  k j (u) ∀ k ≠ i. Total factor productivity growth in each sector is given by
(14)   Ai (true) =   Q i −   
j
 
 
 Θ Li j (  Li  j +   _ z  i j) −   
m
 
 
  Θ Mi m   M i m ,
where  L  i j is the number of workers of type j employed in sector i,  _ z  i j is their aver-
age efficacy, and the  Θ  Li j and  Θ Mi m represent the gross output factor income shares of 
workers of type j and other inputs of type m in sector i, respectively. Conventional 
measures of total factor productivity growth, by ignoring changes in the average 
efficacy of workers, have a bias equal to:
(15)   Ai (est) =   Q i −   
j
 
 
 Θ  Li j   Li j −   
m
 
 
  Θ Mi m   M i m =   Ai (true) +   
j
 
 
 Θ  Li j   _ z  i j
 =   Ai (true) + ξ  
j
 
 
 Θ  Li j   π i j .
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Growth accounting calculations assume intrinsically that all workers of a given 
type are the same. Unless the list of observable worker characteristics completely 
exhausts the determinants of individual productivity, the productivity of the marginal 
worker entering or exiting an industry will generally be different than that of the 
sectoral average for that type of worker. If the elasticity of average worker efficacy 
with respect to the employment share is negative (ξ < 0),14 conventional growth 
accounting will under- or overstate productivity growth in sectors with expanding 
or contracting employment shares, respectively.
Finally, I note that the gross output TFP measures of multiple subsectors can be 
combined to form goods and services value added aggregates using the formula:
(16)   Aj =   
i∈I   (   j )
 
 
  
V A  i  _ 
GD P j   
G O i  _
V A  i    
 A i where GD P j =    
i∈I   (   j )
 
 
 V A  i ,
and where j = goods or services and I   (   j ) is the set of subsectors in j. TFP mea-
sures calculated using the gross output approach equal TFP measures calculated 
using the value added approach times the ratio of the value of gross output to value 
added (G O i / VA i ), so (16) converts subsectoral gross output TFP measures to value 
added TFP measures and aggregates to sectoral totals by weighting by shares of sec-
toral value added. I use this measure to summarize goods and services productivity 
growth further below.
II. Industry Evidence on the Elasticity of Worker Efficacy  
with Respect to Employment Shares
A. Empirical Specification
I use the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification to explore the bias 
in sectoral measures of total factor productivity growth brought about by changing 
labor allocations:
(17)   Yict =  α ic +  δ ct +  γ ic   U ct + ξ   Xict +  ε ict 
   Xict =  α ic X +  δ ct X +  γ  ic X   U ct +  β ic   Zct +  η ict E( ε ict  η ict ) ≠ 0 ,
where   Yict is total factor productivity growth in industry i of country c in period t, 
the  α ic are industry × country dummies capturing mean productivity growth by 
sector, and the  δ ct are country × year dummies capturing economy-wide fluctua-
tions in average productivity growth. There is a well-known association between the 
business cycle and measured productivity growth, driven perhaps by mismeasure-
ment due to changes in capacity utilization and the role real technology shocks play 
14 Equation (15) assumes that ξ is the same for all sectors and types at all times. This is true precisely for some 
distribution functions (e.g., independent draws from fréchet distributions with the same dispersion parameter). 
Otherwise, one must take ξ as an average of the differing elasticities.
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in producing the business cycle. While the country × year dummies account for 
mean economy-wide changes, the ln change in the national unemployment rate   U ct , 
entered separately by industry × country ( γ ic is an industry × country effect), 
 corrects for the cyclical variation in relative industry productivity growth which 
might otherwise appear as correlation with other variables. Finally,   Xict equals the 
labor-income-share-weighted sum of the change in national employment shares by 
worker type, as shown in the right-hand side of (15) earlier. The coefficient ξ, by 
the theory described earlier above, is the elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to 
employment shares, the principal object of interest in the regression.15
The OLS (ordinary least squares) relation between productivity and employment 
shares potentially has both exogenous and endogenous components. On the one hand, 
movements in relative industry demand, due to the growth of aggregate income and 
non-homothetic preferences, will lead to exogenous changes in relative employment 
shares. On the other hand, the response of relative demand to relative price move-
ments brought about by productivity growth may lead to an endogenous response of 
employment shares to productivity growth. There are special cases where these effects 
disappear, such as with homothetic utility and unitary income elasticities of demand 
(no exogenous variation of relative demand) or with Hicks-Neutral technical change 
and unitary price elasticities of demand (no endogenous variation of factor allocations 
with sectoral productivity growth), but it seems reasonable to allow for the existence 
of both in the data.16 As shown in the second line of (17), to correct for potential 
endogeneity I run a first-stage regression in which the labor-income-share-weighted 
changes in sectoral employment shares are regressed on the exogenous variables of 
the total factor productivity equation plus an excluded instrument. The relation of 
the excluded instrument with   Xict is allowed to vary across industries and countries ( β ic varies by industry × country). Variation by industry is necessary, as for an 
instrument to influence employment shares it must raise employment in some indus-
tries at the expense of others, and variation by countries allows for differences in 
the composition of otherwise nominally “identical” sectoral aggregates. Because the 
instrument is interacted by industry × country (i.e., appears multiple times in the 
regression), it is possible to perform a valid overidentification test of the exclusion 
restriction, even though only “one” instrument appears in the regression.17
15 This specification estimates a single ξ, but should be compatible with a world in which  ξ i varies by industry 
and we are estimating an average effect, as the panels are balanced (having the same number of observations for 
each industry) and there are industry dummies, so ξ is being estimated by the equally weighted variation (exclu-
sive of the business cycle) within industries in rates of employment share changes. I should note that estimating ξ 
industry by industry is not sensible, as the resulting sample sizes are tiny (e.g., 20+ observations per industry in the 
United States), while 2SLS relies on asymptotics.
16 Ngai and Pissarides (2007) provide an analysis of the case with homothetic utility, Hicks-Neutral technical 
change, and inelastic demand, where all of the relation between labor allocations and productivity is endogenous. 
Homothetic utility, however, provides a poor characterization of demand, as it implies that relative quantities fall 
with relative prices whereas, as discussed below, the overwhelming trend in the OECD is for relative quantity to 
rise with relative price (reflecting non-unitary income elasticities). Hicks-Neutral technical change misses interest-
ing interactions between factor-biased technical change and the elasticity of substitution. For example, Bustos, 
Caprettini, and Ponticelli (2013) show that despite an infinite elasticity of demand (free trade), labor augmenting 
technical change in the presence of a low elasticity of factor substitution can actually lead to a reduction in sectoral 
employment.
17 Lest the reader think there is an error here, I confirm the distribution of the overidentification test using simu-
lated data which satisfy the exclusion restriction, as discussed further below.
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I draw on two datasets which provide comprehensive measures of private sector 
total factor productivity broken down by sector (  Yict above). First, I use data on total 
factor productivity growth by sector drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
KLEMS (capital, labor, energy, materials, and business services) database, which 
provides estimates of US private sector productivity growth disaggregated into 60 
comprehensive industries from 1987 to 2010.18 As noted earlier, these data do not 
adjust for the changing composition of the labor force, so I use Current Population 
Survey data to develop industry-level measures of the distribution of workers by 
sex × age × education and use these to adjust the total factor productivity growth 
and calculate a compositionally adjusted measure of changing labor shares, as 
described in the online Appendix.19 Second, I use the EU KLEMS database, devel-
oped by the University of Groningen with a consortium of diverse partners, which 
divides  private sector productivity growth in a variety of advanced economies into 
29 comprehensive sectors.20 After removing transition economies, where productiv-
ity growth and factor allocations are likely to be driven by considerations outside 
this paper, the sample consists of 18 countries, namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The productivity estimates run from 1970 to 2005, with the available years varying 
by country. I shall refer to these data as the OECD or OECD 18 sample, notwith-
standing their development in the European Union. Measures of annual unemploy-
ment for the United States and the OECD countries are drawn from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED database.
Turning to potential instruments, I consider simple measures of my own along-
side the more sophisticated constructions of others. Using FRED, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and World Bank data, the instru-
ments I prepare are: (i) the ln change in country defense expenditures over GDP; 
(ii) the average ln change in metal prices (aluminum, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, 
platinum, tin, and zinc); and (iii) the average ln change in oil prices (Dubai and 
West Texas Intermediate). Changes in defense expenditures, driven by events such 
as the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11, are arguably exogenous to sectoral 
18 Calculating industry-level TFP estimates for the United States is a nontrivial task. Whereas most countries 
report capital formation by industry of use, the United States reports these by industry of ownership. Marrying 
these data to the output data and ensuring that the proper value added reallocations are being made in the national 
accounts, while simultaneously dealing with historical changes in sectoral definitions, requires a great deal of inside 
information. The BLS, with its official status and resources, is well positioned to have access to the requisite data 
and knowledge. Given all of the difficulties involved, however, it is not surprising that the BLS, while producing 
aggregate private sector numbers going back to the early postwar era, has only been able to extend the comprehen-
sive sectoral breakdown back to 1987.
19 The adjusted and unadjusted industry measures of total factor productivity growth are available on my  website. 
My calculations indicate that adjustments for the changing sex × age × education composition of the labor force 
lower economy-wide private sector total factor productivity growth between 1987 and 2010 from an average of 
1.25 percent per annum to 0.97 percent per annum.
20 There are actually 31 private sectors, but 2 (“private households with employed persons” and “extra-territorial 
organizations”) are relatively minor and do not appear in all instances. Employment shares are always calculated 
relative to national totals (including the public sector). Although the EU KLEMS TFP calculations adjust for the 
composition of the workforce, the data provided only allow for the calculation of the distribution of total workers 
by sector (not workers by type), so I use the labor income share times the change in the total employment share as 
the X variable, as in equation (7) above. Equations (7) and (15) are identical if the distribution of workers by type is 
proportional to the industry share of total employment: i.e.,  L i 
j =  L j  ( L i /L). For the US KLEMS, I find that substitut-
ing the changing shares of total employment for the changing shares of employment by worker type yields virtually 
identical results, as reported in a footnote below.
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 productivity growth. There is less reason to feel confident in the exogeneity of 
 metals and oil prices. Productivity change in key producing or using industries in 
the US and the OECD countries, which are large actors in the global markets for 
these materials, might produce endogenous responses in prices. While US defense 
spending and materials and oil prices are available for all years of my TFP data, 
because of changes in concepts and coverage, the SIPRI data on OECD country 
military expenditures only extend back to 1988.21
I expand the list of potential instruments by adding all 15 of the nontechnology 
shock instruments considered by Stock and Watson (2012) in their dynamic factor 
model analysis of the US economy. Covering oil prices, monetary policy, uncer-
tainty, liquidity, and fiscal policy, these are:22 (i) Hamilton’s (2003) measure of the 
increase of the oil price PPI relative to the max of the previous three years, avail-
able for 1962–2010; (ii) Kilian’s (2008) measure of the OPEC production shortfall 
from wars and civil strife, available for 1971–2004; (iii) the residuals of Ramey and 
Vine’s (2011) measure of full gasoline prices regressed on lagged macroeconomic 
variables, based on their updated spreadsheet (available 1959–2011); (iv) Romer 
and Romer’s (2004) residual of Fed monetary intentions regressed on internal 
Fed forecasts (1969–1996); (v) Smets and Wouters’ (2007) measure, updated by 
King and Watson (2012), of the shock to the monetary policy reaction function in 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (1959–2004); (vi) Sims and Zha’s 
(2006) monetary policy shock estimated in a structural VAR (vector autoregres-
sion) (1960–2002); (vii) Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson’s (2005) measure of sur-
prise changes in the federal funds rate (1990–2004); (viii) innovations in an AR(2) 
of the VIX, as suggested by Bloom (2009) (1962–2011); (ix) innovations in an 
AR(2) of Baker, Bloom, and Davis’ (2012) policy uncertainty index calculated from 
media references to economic policy (1985–2011); (x) innovations in an AR(2) 
of the TED spread, as provided by Stock and Watson (1971–2011); (xi) innova-
tions in an AR(2) of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek’s (2012) bond premium (1973–2010); 
(xii) Bassett et al.’s (2012) measure of unpredictable changes in bank-level lend-
ing standards (1992–2010); (xiii) Ramey’s (2011) measure of news of changes in 
the net present value of military spending divided by nominal GDP (1959–2010); 
(xiv) Fisher and Peters’ (2010) measure of excess returns on stocks of military con-
tractors (1959–2008); and (xv) Romer and Romer’s (2010) measure of tax changes 
relative to GDP (1959–2007). I average quarterly or monthly shocks to annual levels.
With the exception of Kilian’s oil production shortfall, the Stock and Watson 
instruments listed above are US-centered and not appropriate for an OECD analy-
sis. However, as shown in the pages below, none of these instruments performs at all 
well in the analysis of the US KLEMS. Hence, undertaking the monumental task of 
developing similar instruments country by country is not likely to be profitable. In 
21 The SIPRI website notes that SIPRI has not been able to construct a consistent series extending back to earlier 
dates, and the SIPRI data has now become the standard, reproduced in other online sources (such as the World 
Bank) to the exclusion of any other information. I tried to construct an alternative series of my own using histori-
cal paper issues of The Military Balance, but ultimately concluded that SIPRI’s concerns about coverage and data 
quality are correct.
22 In most cases I use the data provided online by Stock and Watson (2012) and follow their procedures (e.g., 
AR(2)s, regressions on lagged macro-variables, etc.) to construct the instruments. The dataset, however, contains a 
major misreporting of the Ramey-Vine figures (formulas rather than values were copied into the Stock and Watson 
spreadsheet), so I use the updated data from Ramey and Vine (2011).
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fact, the only instrument which consistently satisfies the first-stage requirement of 
significance and the second-stage exclusion restriction is defense spending. Thus, 
my main point in using Stock and Watson’s (2012) extensive list is to highlight the 
difficulty of finding alternative instruments for sectoral labor allocations.
B. Results
I begin by evaluating the suitability of the various instruments to the problem at 
hand. In Table 1 I run the first-stage regression of the specification of equation (17) 
using one instrument at a time, reporting the p-value of the F-test on the instru-
ment23 and the total number of observations. In the case of the OECD, I only use my 
instruments and Kilian’s oil production shortfall, which can be considered part of 
global trends. There are two notable aspects of Table 1. First, virtually all of the fac-
tors considered by Stock and Watson (2012) (instruments d through r) are not mean-
ingful determinants of labor allocations. Only the oil price max measure and Federal 
Funds surprises are significant at the 5 percent level, and these results are suspect as 
other measures of oil prices and monetary policy are quite insignificant. Second, in 
the OECD sample none of the instruments are even close to being significant.
Table 1’s results are perhaps not terribly surprising. To generate a significant real-
location of labor across sectors, an instrument must not merely shift macroeconomic 
supply and demand, it must substantially alter relative industry supply or demand 
away from the norm. Many shocks which have strong aggregate macroeconomic 
consequences and serve as good instruments for the analysis of macro-aggregates 
might not have sufficiently strong relative effects for the objective of this paper. In 
this regard it is noteworthy that Ramey’s (2011) measure of news of changes in the 
NPV (net present value) of military spending is insignificant. Ramey argues that, 
in explaining changes in macroeconomic aggregates in the United States, her news 
variable dominates actual defense spending changes. The macroeconomic influence 
of Ramey’s news variable, however, most likely represents the response of private 
economic actors to the foreseen aggregate consequences (e.g., on demand and tax 
burdens) of that spending. Continuity of private demand suggests that these are 
unlikely to have large effects on the distribution of economic activity, even if they 
affect levels. In contrast, actual defense spending shifts the pattern of demand away 
from the private norm, resulting in more significant changes in sectoral employment 
shares. Thus, Ramey’s finding for macroeconomic aggregates need not extend to 
my analysis of labor allocations. When entered jointly with actual defense spending 
changes in the first-stage regression for the US, I find the p-value on the F-test of 
Ramey’s news variable to be 0.313, while that on actual defense spending changes 
remains 0.000. The insignificance of defense spending in the OECD regressions 
stems from the fact that for 3,358 of the 8,049 observations defense spending changes 
are zero. Defense spending as a share of GDP is extremely stable in most OECD 
countries and, with low values and one decimal precision in the SIPRI data, the sud-
den changes that do occur are most likely reflective of rounding error (e.g., moving 
from 0.9 percent of GDP previously to 1.0 percent ever after in one year in Japan).
23 Although in each case there is only one instrument, its coefficient is allowed to vary by industry × country, 
hence an F-test rather than a t-statistic.
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Table 2 presents second-stage results using each of the four instruments which are 
significant at the 5 percent level in the first-stage regressions for the United States in 
Table 1 (EU KLEMS results are presented later). Aside from the estimate of ξ, the 
elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to the sectoral employment share, I also 
report the p-value of the first-stage F-test (which will vary across specifications) 
and the second-stage χ2 overidentification test.24 In the top panel, which follows 
24 As noted earlier, an overidentification test is possible with one instrument because, since it is entered sepa-
rately for each industry, there are technically actually I (equal to the number of industries) instruments. The overi-
dentification test is whether these instruments have any predictive value in the regression beyond their association 
with changes in employment shares. As the reader might worry that this is somehow econometrically wrong, I have 
used Monte Carlo simulations to confirm the accuracy of the test statistic. Using the covariance of the residuals from 
the first- and second-stage regressions of the baseline specification with defense expenditures, I produce 500,000 
simulated draws of the data under the assumption that (modulo their influence on employment shares) defense 
expenditures are exogenous in the second-stage regression. The resulting test statistic is nearly exact: i.e., the nomi-
nal rejection values are very close to the actual rejection probabilities (see the next paragraph).
I should also note that Basmann (1960) argues that the standard (Sargan 1958) χ2 overidentification test is too 
conservative (i.e., rejects the null too frequently) in finite samples and proposes a small sample adjustment to the 
test statistic. I have confirmed his argument, for my case, using the Monte Carlo simulations described above. I find 
Table 1—First Stage p-value in Regression of Weighted Employment Share Changes on Instruments 
(Instruments evaluated one at a time using specification of equation (17))
United States OECD 18
60 sectors, 1987–2010 29 sectors, 1970–2005 
F p-value N F p-value N
(a) Δ ln country defense expenditures/GDP 0.000 1,380 0.192 8,049
(b) Δ ln metals prices 0.000 1,380 0.374 12,109
(c) Δ ln oil prices 0.833 1,380 0.367 12,109
(d) Oil price increase over prior maximum 
 (Hamilton 2003)
0.005 1,380
(e) OPEC oil production shortfall (Kilian 2008) 0.253 1,020 0.762 11,617
(f) Residual of US gasoline prices
  (Ramey and Vine 2011)
0.965 1,380
(g) Monetary policy shock (Romer and Romer 2004) 0.866 540
(h) Monetary policy reaction shock
  (Smets and Wouters 2007)
0.084 1,020
(i) Monetary policy shock (Sims and Zha 2006) 0.884 900
(j) Fed. funds surprises (Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
 Swanson 2005)
0.000 900
(k) VIX innovation (Bloom 2009) 0.863 1,380
(l) Policy uncertainty index innovation
 (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2012)
0.092 1,380
(m) TED spread innovation (Stock and Watson 2012) 1.000 1,380
(n) Bond premium innovation (Gilchrist and 
 Zakrajšek 2012)
1.000 1,380
(o) Bank lending shocks (Bassett et al. 2012) 0.992 1,140
(p) NPV defense spending news/GDP (Ramey 2011) 0.104 1,380
(q) Excess returns on defense stocks (Fisher and  
 Peters 2010)
0.432 1,260
(r) Tax changes/GDP (Romer and Romer 2010) 0.108 1,200
Notes: F p-value = F-test p-value on the industry × country coefficients associated with the instrument. N = obser-
vations, sample changes with the availability of the instrument. Instruments (d)–(r) calculated using data from 
Stock and Watson (2012); instruments (a)–(c) based upon FRED, SIPRI, and World Bank data, as described in the 
text. Each regression follows the first stage specification given in (17), with industry × country and country × year 
fixed effects and the national unemployment rate change and instruments entered separately for each industry × 
country. The dependent variable is the labor-share-weighted change in the share of employment by worker type (for 
the US) or total industry workers (OECD 18, see footnote 20 above). Each row represents a separate analysis with 
the indicated instrument alone.
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the baseline specification of equation (17), three of the four instrumental variables 
estimates of ξ are substantially negative, although the only statistically significant 
estimate is that found using defense expenditures. Defense spending, however, is the 
only instrument which does not strongly reject the second-stage exclusion restric-
tion. I confirm the likely endogeneity of the oil price instrument by correlating its 
first-stage industry coefficients with the average energy share of gross output in 
Sargan’s χ2 test to be grossly conservative (rejecting, as examples, 15.5 percent of the time at the 5 percent level 
and 4.6 percent of the time at the 1 percent level), while Basmann’s small sample correction is only slightly con-
servative (rejecting 5.8 percent of the time at the 5 percent level and 1.3 percent of the time at the 1 percent level). 
Consequently, throughout this paper I use Basmann’s statistic as the overidentification test. 
Table 2—Annual TFP Growth on Changes in Employment Shares  
(United States: 60 sectors × 1987–2010)
OLS 2SLS by type of instrument
Δ Defense
spending
Δ Metals
prices
Oil price
maximum
Fed funds
surprises
Panel A. Baseline specification (equation (17))
ξ (SE) −0.218 (0.108) −0.922 (0.266) −0.546 (0.318) 0.372 (0.384) −0.468 (0.318)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.148 0.000, 0.004 0.005, 0.000 0.000, 0.000
N/K/L 1,380 1,380/199/59 1,380/199/59 1,380/199/59 900/191/59
Panel B. Dropping unemployment controls by industry (business cycle adjustment)
ξ (SE) −0.167 (0.100) −0.359 (0.226) −0.245 (0.452) 0.359 (0.396) −0.742 (0.412)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.031 0.440, 0.000 0.033, 0.000 0.371, 0.002
Panel C. Substituting ln changes in capacity utilization for unemployment controls
ξ (SE) −0.240 (0.100) −0.689 (0.222) −0.465 (0.346) 0.363 (0.375) −0.654 (0.343)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.009 0.003, 0.478 0.029, 0.000 0.044, 0.950
Panel D. Adding ln changes in capacity utilization to unemployment controls
ξ (SE) −0.207 (0.109) −0.771 (0.254) −0.457 (0.332) 0.372 (0.364) −0.596 (0.319)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.260 0.000, 0.427 0.003, 0.000 0.000, 0.663
Panel E. Dropping country × year dummies (common component of TFP growth)
ξ (SE) −0.257 (0.107) −1.03 (0.263) −0.738 (0.318) 0.372 (0.390) −0.541 (0.317)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.146 0.000, 0.001 0.007, 0.000 0.000, 0.000
Panel F. Dropping one industry at a time
Max ξ (SE) −0.119 (0.107) −0.812 (0.264) −0.300 (0.325) 0.636 (0.441) −0.045 (0.315)
Min ξ (SE) −0.328 (0.113) −1.13 (0.312) −0.915 (0.318) −0.007 (0.386) −0.872 (0.363)
Max F p-value 0.000 0.015 0.048 0.003
Min F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Max χ2 p-value 0.582 0.067 0.004 0.000
Min χ2 p-value 0.075 0.001 0.000 0.000
Panel G. Adding four lags of employment share changes
∑ ξ (SE) −0.685 (0.209) −0.750 (0.283) −0.547 (0.338) −0.233 (0.348) −0.621 (0.359)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.068 0.048, 0.002 0.083, 0.009 0.000, 0.000
Notes: ξ (SE) = coefficient (standard error) on labor-share-weighted changes of employment shares by 
worker type. F and χ2 p-value = p-value on first-stage significance and second-stage overidentification tests. 
N/K/L = number of observations/number of regressors in first-stage/excluded instruments in second stage. 
Because of the joint year and industry dummies, one of the industry coefficients for each of the variables entered 
by industry (i.e., unemployment and capacity changes and instruments) is colinear with other variables and is 
dropped in all specifications other than those without year dummies. Thus, there are only 59 excluded instruments 
in the baseline specification. ∑ ξ = sum of the coefficients on current and four lags of weighted employment share 
changes.
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those industries. If this instrument represents exogenous shifts in prices, then its 
effect should be substantially negatively correlated with the energy intensity of pro-
duction: i.e., industries which are more energy intensive should see their relative 
employment share fall with exogenous increases in oil prices, as their supply curves 
shift up. In practice, I find a correlation coefficient of 0.232. While not significant 
( p-value = 0.077), the correlation is of the wrong sign. This might occur if some 
of the increases in the price of oil represent an endogenous positive response to ris-
ing energy demand in using industries. In sum, of 18 potential instruments, only 1 
(defense expenditures) satisfies the dual requirements of first-stage significance and 
second-stage exogeneity, and that instrument produces a strongly negative (−0.922) 
estimate of ξ.
The lower panels of Table 2 examine the sensitivity of the results to the specifi-
cation. In panel B I remove the unemployment rate entered by industry. This has a 
very large impact on the estimates, dramatically reducing the estimate of ξ for both 
defense expenditures and metal prices, raising it for Federal Funds surprises, and 
rendering both metals prices and Fed surprises completely insignificant in the first-
stage regression. In panel C I substitute the Federal Reserve’s estimate of aggregate 
mining, manufacturing, and utilities capacity utilization for the unemployment rate, 
interacting it by industry as was done for unemployment. As shown, this moves ξ 
back to the estimates of panel A, although the value using defense expenditures 
(−0.689) is less extreme than in the baseline specification (−0.922). The Fed’s 
measure of capacity utilization, however, does not exhaust the association of indus-
try productivity and labor allocations with the business cycle. Adding the measure of 
aggregate capacity utilization to the baseline specification with unemployment and 
defense spending, I find that the industry coefficients on the unemployment rate in 
both the first- and second-stage regressions remain highly significant (F p-values of 
0.000 and 0.003, respectively), suggesting that the business cycle characteristics of 
relative industry productivity and employment may go beyond capacity utilization 
and mismeasurement to something real. The estimate of ξ from defense spending 
in this specification is −0.771 (panel D). In general, controlling for the association 
between the business cycle and relative labor allocations and productivity seems 
appropriate25 and this matters in the regression because the correlation between 
defense spending changes and changes in the unemployment rate in this time period 
is quite strong (0.649 with a p-value of 0.001). Nevertheless, the reader looking to 
see whether the defense spending results can be rendered insignificant need look no 
further than panel B. Panel E of Table 2 shows that removing the year dummies, but 
retaining the unemployment controls, generally increases the magnitude of ξ, with 
the negative estimate using metals prices now appearing significant.
Panel F of Table 2 explores whether identification and significance come from one 
particular industry by rerunning the baseline specification 60 times, removing one 
industry each time, and reporting the maximum-minimum range of the estimates of 
ξ and the F and χ2 p-values. As shown, the estimates of ξ based upon the nondefense 
instruments vary enormously, but the range for defense expenditures is much more 
limited. Also of note is the stability of the first- and second-stage tests for defense 
25 To see this, the reader might introspect and consider their reaction if I had informed them that the estimate 
of ξ was substantially negative, but only when measures of the business cycle are excluded from the regression.
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expenditures. Regardless of which industry is removed, defense spending is always 
found to be highly significant in the first-stage regression and exogenous in the 
second-stage overidentification test. In fact, removing all possible combinations of 
two and even three industries, the first-stage p-value on defense spending never rises 
above 2.3 × 10−8, the p-value on its second-stage overidentification test never falls 
below 0.011, and the coefficient never becomes less negative than −0.590 (0.274). 
Thus, the correlations between defense expenditures, employment, and productivity 
which lie behind the significant coefficients reported in the top panel of Table 2 go 
far beyond one, two, or even three key industries.
Figure 4 provides further insight into the variation identifying the coefficients 
associated with defense expenditures reported in Table 2. For the horizontal axis, 
I project annual KLEMS industry output growth on industry dummies, time dum-
mies, changes in the national unemployment rate (entered by industry), and changes 
in defense expenditures over GDP (entered separately by industry). The coefficients 
reported in the figure are the industry-defense expenditures relationships.26 For the 
vertical axis, I run the same specification and report the same type of coefficients, 
but this time using labor-share-weighted changes in employment shares by type as 
the dependent variable. Thus, the figure compares the defense expenditure coeffi-
cients for the first-stage regression of the results reported above with the same first-
stage regression run with output growth as the dependent variable. What the figure 
shows is that the two sets of coefficients are highly correlated ( ρ = 0.592, p-value 
26 Given the year and industry dummies in the regression, the defense spending coefficients are not identified for 
one industry (the base), which I take as Food and Beverage and Tobacco Products. Thus, the coefficients reported 
in the figure are changes relative to that industry.
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Figure 4. First-Stage Regression on Defense Expenditures
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= 0.000), even when the four outliers with employment change coefficients greater 
than 0.2 in absolute value are removed (ρ = 0.357, p-value = 0.007).27 Thus, the 
first-stage regressions underlying the results reported above appear to be based upon 
something real. Changes in defense expenditures change the demand for the output 
of industries, inducing changes in their employment shares.
The estimates using annual data in Table 2 might not provide an accurate represen-
tation of long-run effects. On the one hand, it is possible that short-run coefficients 
overstate the negative influence of the employment share on sectoral productivity 
as workers entering a sector are likely to be less productive initially than they will 
be in the long run, once they acquire sector-specific human capital. On the other 
hand, it is possible that short-run coefficients actually understate the negative effect 
of the employment share on sectoral productivity. Worker reallocations come about 
through changes in equilibrium output, either due to a shift of supply or demand. A 
sudden increase in output will lead to an influx of workers and, typically, a transitory 
rise in capacity utilization, producing a transitory overstatement of productivity.28 
Thus, this mismeasurement of productivity will be positively correlated with the 
movement of workers into a sector, understating the negative influence this other-
wise has on measured productivity.29
Panel G of Table 2 addresses the issue of long-run effects by adding four lagged 
values of the labor-share-weighted change in employment shares as predetermined 
exogenous right-hand side variables to the baseline specification, with current 
employment reallocations instrumented with the instrument specified in each col-
umn. The cumulative effect on long-run-measured productivity is given by the sum 
of the current and lagged coefficients, which is presented in the table. Comparing 
these with the baseline results at the top of the table, one sees that ξ is now somewhat 
smaller in magnitude in the defense expenditures analysis (−0.750 versus −0.922 
earlier), while the oil price maximum, which earlier reported an insignificant posi-
tive coefficient, is no longer first-stage significant and now produces a negative point 
estimate of ξ. The metals prices coefficient is unchanged, while that for Fed sur-
prises is more negative.
Table 2 also reports OLS results, running each specification without instruments. 
Although the baseline OLS relation between employment share changes and pro-
ductivity (−0.218) is small, the long-run cumulative association, as evidenced by 
panel G of Table 2’s regression with lags of past employment changes, is much 
more negative (−0.685). It is difficult to explain how past employment changes 
relate negatively to current productivity growth within a framework where employ-
ment shares reflect the endogenous response of demand to shifts of the supply curve 
27 Not shown in the figure, however, is that the average t-statistic of the coefficients on the horizontal axis is 0.63 
and the average t-statistic of the coefficients on the vertical axis is 0.92. Thus, while defense expenditures are overall 
very significantly correlated with industry output growth and employment share changes (F-tests), the estimated 
relationship, industry by industry, is quite imprecise.
28 This applies even for instruments which shift the supply curve, provided they satisfy the exclusion restriction: 
i.e., are not directly correlated with total factor productivity growth. If something shifts the supply curve down 
without changing fundamental productive capacity, it will lead to an expansion of output which, along with the rise 
in the employment share, should produce a transitory increase in capacity utilization.
29 As there are now a variety of mismeasurements, I should clarify. The object of interest in this paper is the 
mismeasurement of productivity due to the failure to account for the changing efficacy of workers as a sector’s 
employment share expands. The transitory mismeasurement due to capacity utilization, however, works in the 
opposite direction and may temporarily conceal the effect I’m studying.
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brought about by productivity change. The result is easier to comprehend, however, 
if one moves to a framework where changes in employment shares reflect exog-
enous shifts of the demand curve brought about by nonunitary income elasticities of 
demand and other shocks to relative demand. When demand shifts out in an industry, 
it produces a transitory rise in capacity utilization and a spurious rise in productiv-
ity, minimizing the negative effect of employment shifts on measured productivity. 
Over time, however, capacity adjusts and the full impact is revealed. Evidence in 
favor of this argument can be found by regressing total factor productivity growth on 
industry output growth, with industry, year, and unemployment × industry controls 
as in the baseline specification. With only current output growth in the regression, 
the OLS coefficient (standard error) for my 60 industry sample is 0.219 (0.025). 
With four lags of past output in the regression, the cumulative OLS coefficient is 
0.076 (0.058). Thus, past output increases, like past employment increases, lead 
to lower current productivity growth, which is consistent with the utilization story 
outlined above.
Table 3 supports the preceding argument using the Federal Reserve Board’s 
industry-level measures of capacity utilization, defined as current output over 
maximum sustainable output.30 These measures are only available for the 22 min-
ing, manufacturing, and utilities industries in the 60 sector KLEMS disaggregation 
of private sector activity. In this table I run regressions with either the change in 
capacity utilization or total factor productivity growth as the “Y” variables, and 
either the growth of output or the labor-income-share-weighted change in the share 
of economy-wide employment by type, the right-hand side variable of interest in 
the regressions reported above, as the “X” variable. Each regression includes a 
complete set of industry and time dummies and the change in the unemployment 
rate entered separately by industry, as in the baseline specification of equation (17). 
Aside from results with the current value of “X” alone, I also report the cumulative 
sum of the coefficients in a specification with the current value and four predeter-
mined lags of “X.”
I begin by taking both X variables as exogenous, running OLS specifications in 
panels A and B of Table 3. In the first two columns we see that an increase in cur-
rent output raises both capacity utilization and measured total factor productivity 
growth, but that the cumulative long-run effect, once lags are allowed, is insignifi-
cantly different from zero in both cases. In the third column of the table, we see that 
a 1 percent increase in a sector’s labor-income-share-weighted employment share 
is associated with a large 1.7 percent short-run rise in capacity utilization, but has 
no long-run effects. Regarding measured TFP, in the fourth column of Table 3, an 
increase in the sectoral employment share has no significant short-run impact on 
productivity, but a very large (−1.1) long-run effect. These results are completely 
consistent with a view of exogenous demand fluctuations producing transitory 
30 These measures are based upon the Survey of Plant Capacity and are defined as “the greatest level of output 
the plant can maintain within the framework of a realistic work schedule after factoring in normal downtime and 
assuming sufficient availability of inputs to operate the capital in place.” (Gilbert, Morin, and Raddock 2000, p. 
194). The survey measures are then regressed on a time trend, ln capital and dummies which correct for outliers. 
This suggests that the reported series is basically a smoothed version of the original data, allowing outliers that the 
Fed believes represents real changes.
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movements in capacity utilization which obscure the true effect of labor allocations 
on measured productivity.31
The preceding is intended to be heuristic, and should not be taken completely 
literally. In particular, one cannot interpret the results as necessarily indicating that 
all changes in equilibrium quantity demanded (and labor allocations) are exogenous 
to productivity. To proceed more carefully, panels C and D of Table 3 instrument 
each X with defense expenditures, the instrument which I have previously found to 
be consistently first-stage significant and second-stage exogenous. As before, I enter 
the instrument separately for each industry, and as before the first- and second-stage 
test statistics satisfy the requirements of 2SLS in an admirably robust and consistent 
fashion.
Turning to coefficient estimates, the first notable result is that columns 1 and 3 of 
panels C and D indicate that defense expenditures, while moving around output and 
labor allocations, have absolutely no effect on industry-level capacity utilization. 
This is consistent with Ramey’s (2011) argument that defense spending changes 
are well anticipated by public news announcements. While Ramey’s news variable 
is completely insignificant in the first-stage regressions for this sample, as it was 
before, this merely confirms that the timing of news is different than the timing of 
31 One can try to use the Fed’s industry capacity utilization measures to directly adjust productivity, but this 
raises additional issues. First, an OLS regression approach is unsuitable, because industry capacity utilization is 
endogenous to industry productivity, but instruments for industry-level capacity utilization are hard to find, as 
defense spending is uncorrelated with capacity utilization (see below). Second, one can use the utilization estimates 
to mechanically adjust productivity, but this requires some assumptions about what is being over- and underuti-
lized (capital; capital and labor; or capital, labor, and some material inputs like energy) and what would have to 
be changed to reach sustainable output. For my purposes, however, it is sufficient to simply show that as capacity 
utilization effects disappear in the long run, the OLS relation between employment shares and productivity becomes 
decidedly negative.
Table 3—Response of Capacity Utilization and Productivity to Output and Employment Share Changes 
(22 industries, 1987–2010)
X variable: Δ Output Δ Employment share
Y variable: Δ Cap U Δ TFP Δ Cap U Δ TFP
Panel A. OLS, current value of X
Coefficient (SE) 0.548 (0.028) 0.186 (0.036) 1.70 (0.204) 0.137 (0.215)
Panel B. OLS, adding four lagged values of X
∑ Coefficient (SE) 0.035 (0.050) −0.096 (0.084) −0.364 (0.343) −1.11 (0.420)
Panel C. 2SLS, current value of X instrumented with Δ defense expenditures
Coefficient (SE) 0.070 (0.086) −0.192 (0.097) −0.030 (0.487) −1.57 (0.509)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.891 0.000, 0.103 0.000, 0.929 0.000, 0.236
N/K/L 506/85/21 506/85/21 506/85/21 506/85/21
Panel D. 2SLS, adding four predetermined lagged values of X
∑ Coefficient (SE) −0.041 (0.060) −0.248 (0.100) −0.234 (0.399) −1.78 (0.509)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.568 0.000, 0.087 0.005, 0.771 0.005, 0.343
N/K/L 418/85/21 418/85/21 418/85/21 418/85/21
Notes: Δ Cap U = ln change in Federal Reserve Board’s measure of industry capacity utilization; 
Δ TFP = ln change in TFP index, adjusted for labor quality (dependent variable in Table 2); Coefficient (SE) 
= coefficient (standard error) on the current X variable; ∑ Coefficient = sum of the coefficients on current and four 
lags of the X variable. F and χ2 p-value and N/K/L as in Table 2.
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actual expenditures.32 Nevertheless, actual expenditures, when they arrive, may be 
well anticipated, so that capacity expands evenly with production needs, resulting 
in no changes in capacity utilization. Because defense spending has no observable 
impact on capacity utilization, the long- and short-term coefficients for productiv-
ity growth (in the second and fourth columns of panels C and D in Table 3) are 
virtually identical. The elasticity of observed productivity with respect to output 
is estimated to be around −0.2 (standard error of about 0.1). The coefficient on 
 labor-share-weighted changes in employment shares, which following the theory 
above is interpretable as the elasticity of average worker efficacy with respect to the 
employment share, is found to be about −1.5 in this sample of only 22 industries 
(standard error of about 0.5). This is greater in absolute magnitude than the maxi-
mum of −1 allowable by theory, but not (statistically) significantly so.
To summarize the results for the US KLEMS, out of 18 potential instruments, 
defense spending is the only one which consistently and strongly satisfies the dual 
requirements of first-stage significance and second-stage exogeneity. Long- and 
short-term effects for defense spending are quite similar, as defense spending does 
not have much of an influence on capacity utilization. The long-term OLS associa-
tion between changing labor allocations and measured productivity is much more 
negative than the short-term relation, and this appears to reflect transitory capacity 
utilization changes consistent with exogenous shifts in demand. The long-term OLS 
estimate of the elasticity of worker efficacy with respect to employment shares in the 
total US KLEMS sample (−0.685 in Table 2) is not significantly different from that 
arrived at using defense expenditures as an instrument (−0.750). Thus, while there 
may be some endogeneity of labor allocations, it probably accounts for a relatively 
small share of the total variation (exogenous plus endogenous) in this variable.33
Turning now to the EU KLEMS OECD data, as I do not have any instrument 
which is first-stage significant in the analysis of the entire dataset, I focus on coun-
try-specific results. Since defense spending is a robustly significant and exogenous 
instrument in the US KLEMS data, I begin by running country by country first-
stage regressions using defense spending as an instrument. I then proceed to the 
second-stage analysis for the four non-US countries where I find defense spend-
ing to be first-stage significant at the 5 percent level (namely Australia, Finland, 
32 Using Ramey’s variable as the instrument in the first-stage regressions for output and employment share 
changes, I get p-values on the F-tests of 0.161 and 0.483, respectively. Running Ramey’s instrument jointly with 
current expenditures in these regressions, I get p-values of 0.837 and 0.992 on her news variable and 0.000 and 
0.000 on actual expenditures. As emphasized earlier above, none of this invalidates Ramey’s point that her news 
variable does a better job of explaining changes in macroeconomic aggregates, which will be influenced by the 
reaction of private economic actors to the anticipated future consequences of those expenditures. This is distinct, 
however, from moving actual patterns of production away from the private norm, in which actual expenditures have 
a more significant effect.
33 As noted earlier, while the preceding analysis is based upon my labor composition adjustment of BLS TFP 
growth and my estimates of changing sectoral employment shares by type, results are quite similar if I use the 
original BLS data on productivity and labor allocations without differentiation by worker type. For example, using 
defense spending as an instrument, I get the following estimates (standard error) of ξ for the panels in Table 2: panel 
A: −1.06 (0.275); B: −0.373 (0.218); C: −0.722 (0.218); D: −1.03 (0.275); E: −1.17 (0.269); and G: −0.769 
(0.292). These follow the patterns presented in the table. The corresponding short-term and long-term OLS results 
(panels A and G) are −0.377 (0.122) and −0.809 (0.218). In Table 3, looking at the third and fourth columns of 
panels C and D, where employment share changes are instrumented with defense expenditures, I get insignificant 
short- and long-term coefficients for capacity utilization of −0.062 (0.475) and −0.390 (0.376) and short- and 
long-term coefficients for BLS-measured TFP growth of −1.82 (0.502) and −1.84 (0.514). Again, these results 
parallel those reported above.
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the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). As shown in Table 4, in each of these 
 countries defense spending satisfies the second-stage exclusion requirement and 
produces negative estimates of ξ, although only the large point estimates of Australia 
and the United Kingdom are statistically significant. Removing one industry at a 
time, I find that defense spending robustly satisfies the first- and second-stage signif-
icance and exclusion requirements. The point estimates of ξ vary greatly for Finland 
and the Netherlands and much less so for Australia and the United Kingdom, in 
keeping with their relative standard errors in the baseline specification. Adding lags 
of employment share changes to the regression produces a much larger estimate 
of the cumulative negative effect of reallocation on productivity, particularly for 
Finland and the Netherlands. 
The EU KLEMS database has two sets of estimates for the United States—one 
covering 1977–2005 based upon the current NAICS (North American Industry 
Classification System) used in the US KLEMS, and another covering 1970–2005 
based upon the historical SIC (standard industrial classification). The industrial sec-
tors in both series share the same nominal titles and have TFP estimates grouped 
into the same 29 private sector divisions which I use in the general analysis of 
(SIC-based) EU KLEMS data for other countries.34 Both of these series provide a 
longer time series than the BLS’ US KLEMS (covering 1987–2010) and appear to 
be developed independently of that source. As in the case of the US KLEMS, I run 
first-stage regressions for each of the 18 instruments in Table 1 and then proceed to 
the second stage with those instruments which are significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 5 reports second-stage results for the six instruments which are first-stage 
significant at the 5 percent level in the EU KLEMS US NAICS data. Defense expen-
ditures operate much as in the analysis of the US KLEMS, producing an extremely 
large negative estimate of ξ in the baseline specification, first- and second-stage 
 significance, and exclusion test statistics which are quite robust to the removal of one 
34 Whenever I refer to results using all of the EU KLEMS data, as in Table 1’s first-stage regressions, I use the 
SIC version of the US data, in keeping with the SIC definitions used for other countries.
Table 4—Country-Level Analysis Using EU KLEMS Data (29 sectors, 1970–2005)
Australia Finland Netherlands United Kingdom
Panel A. Baseline specification (equation (17)) with Δ defense expenditures/GDP as instrument
ξ (SE) −1.09 (0.185) −0.310 (0.359) −0.264 (0.335) −0.886 (0.153)
F and χ2 p-value 0.004, 0.901 0.000, 0.841 0.005, 0.290 0.000, 0.631
N/K/L 493/100/28 493/100/28 493/100/28 493/100/28
Panel B. Dropping one industry at a time
Max ξ (SE) −1.03 (0.176) −0.079 (0.395) 0.152 (0.406) −0.727 (0.165)
Min ξ (SE) −1.18 (0.193) −0.682 (0.406) −0.472 (0.366) −1.10 (0.198)
Max F p-value 0.012 0.004 0.038 0.001
Min F p-value 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Max χ2 p-value 0.960 0.941 0.691 0.809
Min χ2 p-value 0.653 0.712 0.026 0.534
Panel C. Adding four lags of employment share changes
∑ ξ (SE) −1.15 (0.307) −0.801 (0.424) −0.560 (0.407) −0.985 (0.206)
F and χ2 p-value 0.014, 0.873 0.000, 0.728 0.001, 0.272 0.000, 0.928
Note: As in Table 2.
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industry at a time, and (once lags are accounted for) a somewhat smaller estimate 
of the cumulative effect of employment changes. The oil price maximum, which 
produced a positive point estimate of ξ earlier in Table 1, generates a ξ of −1.1 in 
this case. However, notwithstanding its statistical significance in the baseline speci-
fication, with the removal of one industry this coefficient is easily made positive. 
The remaining four instruments produce a cornucopia of insignificant results in the 
baseline regression, are often quite sensitive to the removal of one industry at a time 
and, when employment change lags are added, produce big cumulative negative 
estimates of ξ and are found to be utterly insignificant in the first-stage regression. 
In sum, as in the analysis of the BLS US data, only defense spending consistently 
satisfies the first- and second-stage tests, and that instrument produces an estimate 
of ξ close to −1.
Table 6 reports second-stage results for the six instruments which are first-stage 
significant at the 5 percent level in the EU KLEMS US SIC data. Three of these 
instruments (defense spending, oil price maximum, and the TED spread) overlap 
with the list for the EU KLEMS US NAICS data. While the oil price maximum and 
TED spread produce results which are similar to those in Table 5, those with defense 
expenditures are dramatically different. Although defense spending is first-stage 
significant and second-stage exogenous in the baseline specification, it produces 
a small and statistically insignificant estimate of ξ. With lags, however, the coef-
ficient becomes considerably more negative, albeit not statistically significant. With 
regards to the remaining instruments, the point estimates are generally quite sensi-
tive to the removal of one industry or the first-stage regression is rendered insignifi-
cant once lags are introduced. With the introduction of lags the cumulative effect of 
employment changes becomes much more negative, although the TED spread is the 
only instrument in this specification which is strongly significant and exogenous. 
Its estimate of ξ is both substantially negative (−0.760) and statistically significant.
As Tables 5 and 6 suggest, there are peculiar differences between the SIC-
based and NAICS-based EU KLEMS data for the United States. The correlation 
Table 5—US Analysis Using NAICS-Based US Data in EU KLEMS (By instrument, 29 sectors, 1977–2005)
Δ Defense
spending
Δ Oil 
prices
Oil price
maximum
Smets/Wouters
M shock
Sims/Zha
M shock
TED spread
innovation
Panel A. Baseline specification (equation (17 ))
ξ (SE) −1.06 (0.425) −0.838 (0.424) −1.13 (0.331) −0.740 (0.413) 0.932 (0.476) 0.047 (0.328)
F and χ2 p-value 0.003, 0.524 0.003, 0.000 0.000, 0.000 0.002, 0.307 0.007, 0.869 0.000, 0.001
N/K/L 812/111/28 812/111/28 812/111/28 783/110/28 725/108/28 812/111/28
Panel B. Dropping one industry at a time
Max ξ (SE) −0.873 (0.427) 0.667 (0.554) 0.282 (0.404) −0.520 (0.426) 1.08 (0.510) 0.241 (0.361)
Min ξ (SE) −1.20 (0.455) −1.43 (0.435) −1.72 (0.363) −1.10 (0.463) 0.763 (0.530) −0.380 (0.333)
Max F p-value 0.012 0.155 0.000 0.079 0.048 0.000
Min F p-value 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Max χ2 p-value 0.697 0.001 0.011 0.440 0.942 0.009
Min χ2 p-value 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.205 0.693 0.000
Panel C. Adding four lags of employment share changes
∑ ξ (SE) −0.851 (0.394) −2.16 (0.500) −1.86 (0.404) −0.944 (0.456) −0.626 (0.607) −0.809 (0.457)
F and χ2 p-value 0.045, 0.528 0.339, 0.020 0.018, 0.082 0.271, 0.066 0.865, 0.988 0.396, 0.000
Note: As in Table 2.
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between the annual industry × year total factor productivity growth in one dataset 
and the other—for the 29 nominally identical35 large private sector industry group-
ings and the 28 years which the two datasets overlap—is only 0.502 (i.e., an R2 
of 0.25), despite the fact that they ostensibly measure exactly the same thing. The 
 labor-income-share-weighted labor reallocation measures, however, are much more 
similar, with a correlation of 0.860 (R2 = 0.74). Not surprisingly, this produces radi-
cally different regression results. There are also some disturbing anomalies in the 
EU KLEMS SIC-based US data and in the EU KLEMS dataset as a whole.36 Such 
concerns are, however, somewhat beside the point, as it cannot be taken as alto-
gether surprising that a single instrument, such as defense spending, will in some 
specifications or some datasets produce weaker results.
Before concluding, I present the OLS results for the EU KLEMS data. As shown 
in Table 7, the results here closely parallel those for the United States. Whether in 
the four European countries examined in the tables above, either of the SIC and 
35 For example, “mining and quarrying,” “education,” “rubber and plastics,” etc.
36 For example, between 1970 and 1981, according to the EU KLEMS SIC data, the relative value-added price of 
private sector services to goods in the United States fell 27 percent, while the relative quantity rose by 25 percent, 
for a −2 percent change in relative nominal value added. According to the current official US National Income 
and Product Accounts, however, during this same period the relative value-added price of private sector services 
to goods actually declined only 5 percent (reflecting rising energy prices), while the relative quantity rose by 14 
percent, for a +9 percent change in relative nominal value added (Chain47on.xls and VA47on.xls available at www.
bea.gov). The historical SIC series on the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) website (GDPbyInd_VA_SIC.xls) 
does not provide real indices back to 1970, but in the 1977–1981 period it shows an 8 percent increase in relative 
real service quantity and 5 percent decrease in relative price (similar to the current series 7 percent and 3 percent 
figures for the same period), while the EU KLEMS SIC data show a 15 percent increase in relative quantity and 13 
percent decline in relative price. In making these comparisons, I follow the BEA’s definition of goods (agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, and construction) and services (all other private sector).
As another example, in the EU KLEMS data one finds that in 3 percent of the observations with total factor 
productivity estimates capital income is negative, averaging −0.14 of value added and −0.05 of gross output and 
ranging as far as −5.7 times value added or −0.33 of gross output. In these observations, appearing in 16 countries, 
one gets very close (R2 = 0.985) to the EU KLEMS estimate of total factor productivity growth by dropping capital 
growth while using the gross output shares of intermediate inputs and labor (i.e., weights which combined now 
exceed 1) to calculate the contribution of these inputs to output growth.
Table 6—US Analysis Using SIC-Based US Data in EU KLEMS (By instrument, 29 sectors, 1970–2005)
Δ Defense
spending
Oil price
maximum
Residual
gas prices
Romer/Romer
M shock
Fed funds
surprises
TED spread
innovation
Panel A. Baseline specification (equation (17 ))
ξ (SE) −0.118 (0.251) −0.821 (0.350) −0.329 (0.413) 0.162 (0.373) −0.234 (0.485) 0.086 (0.326)
F and χ2 p-value 0.000, 0.151 0.000, 0.000 0.031, 0.000 0.036, 0.385 0.001, 0.000 0.000, 0.644
N/K/L 1,015/118/28 1,015/118/28 1,015/118/28 754/109/28 435/98/28 1,015/118/28
Panel B. Dropping one industry at a time
Max ξ (SE) −0.048 (0.240) −0.173 (0.369) −0.035 (0.400) 0.358 (0.472) 0.412 (0.557) 0.251 (0.320)
Min ξ (SE) −0.191 (0.468) −1.14 (0.399) −2.49 (0.981) −0.006 (0.384) −0.599 (0.483) −0.072 (0.446)
Max F p-value 0.000 0.004 0.926 0.058 0.013 0.000
Min F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.000
Max χ2 p-value 0.723 0.000 0.008 0.676 0.004 0.876
Min χ2 p-value 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.363
Panel C. Adding four lags of employment share changes
∑ ξ (SE) −0.550 (0.449) −1.55 (0.395) −1.42 (0.459) −1.14 (0.532) −0.351 (0.640) −0.760 (0.384)
F and χ2 p-value 0.034, 0.540 0.000, 0.000 0.048, 0.000 0.206, 0.748 0.002, 0.000 0.000, 0.879
Note: As in Table 2.
3663YOUNG: STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE COST DISEASE OF SERVICES VOL. 104 NO. 11
NAICS versions of EU KLEMS US data, or the EU KLEMS database as a whole, 
the association between employment share changes and productivity growth is neg-
ative, but becomes much more so when past employment share changes are added 
to the regression. As in the case of the US data, the difference between the current 
and cumulative coefficients lends itself to the interpretation that exogenous move-
ments in demand produce transitory changes in capacity utilization which obscure 
the strongly negative long-term association between employment shares and mea-
sured productivity. The cumulative OLS coefficients are in most cases quite close 
to the corresponding cumulative coefficients using 2SLS, suggesting that much of 
the variation in labor shares is exogenous. I recognize of course that this interpre-
tation—taking employment shares as being exogenous and OLS coefficients as 
accurate representations of causal relations—is awfully convenient in a paper which 
struggles to find more than one robust instrument.
The EU KLEMS results, by and large, confirm the analysis using the US KLEMS. 
Defense spending is the only instrument which is consistently first-stage significant, 
second-stage exogenous, and robust—both in terms of test statistics and coefficient 
point estimates—to the selective removal of industries. Long-term OLS elasticities 
are more negative than short-term relations. The cumulative estimate of ξ, both OLS 
and 2SLS with defense spending, is always more negative than −0.5 and often much 
closer to the theoretical limit of −1. Standard errors, however, are very large and 
coefficient estimates in particular specifications and samples are not significantly 
different from zero. Thus, while the preponderance of evidence suggests that aver-
age worker efficacy does indeed fall with a sector’s employment share, there is sub-
stantial uncertainty regarding the precise magnitude of the elasticity.
I conclude by simply considering how different values of ξ change our assessment 
of relative goods and services productivity growth. In Table 8 I combine the 60-sec-
tor US KLEMS and 29-sector EU KLEMS sectoral estimates of gross output private 
sector productivity growth into goods and services value-added aggregates. With a ξ 
of 0 (i.e., no adjustment for Roy effects) the US and EU KLEMS data indicate that 
productivity growth is 0.8 percent faster per annum in goods than services in the 
United States and 1.4 percent faster per annum in the OECD 18 as a whole. Moving 
down, as ξ becomes more negative the gap between goods and services productivity 
Table 7—OLS Regressions Using EU KLEMS (29 sectors, 1971–2005)
Australia Finland Netherlands UK US NAICS US SIC OECD 18
Panel A. Baseline specification with employment share changes (equation (17 ))
ξ (SE) −0.875
(0.061)
−0.266
(0.095)
−0.485
(0.092)
−0.777
(0.068)
−0.518
(0.119)
−0.344
(0.094)
−0.422
(0.023)
Observations 667 1,015 754 986 812 1,015 12,109
Panel B. Adding four lags of employment share changes
∑ ξ (SE) −0.941
(0.202)
−0.726
(0.148)
−0.756
(0.181)
−1.05
(0.126)
−0.946
(0.197)
−0.929
(0.196)
−0.615
(0.048)
Observations 551 899 638 870 696 899 10,025
Note: As in Table 2.
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growth narrows until, at a value of −0.75, it disappears altogether in both samples.37 
Table 8 also reports aggregate private sector productivity growth, equal to the pri-
vate sector GDP share weighted sum of sectoral productivity growths, which is quite 
insensitive to ξ, as increases in one sector are offset by decreases in the other.
In the US National Income and Product Accounts, between 1947 and 2011 the 
ln relative price of services to goods increases at an average annual rate of 0.83 
percent, while the ln relative quantity increases by 0.90 percent. According to the 
EU KLEMS data, between 1970 and 2005 the ln relative price of services to goods 
in the OECD 18 increases at an average annual rate of 1.14 percent, while the ln 
relative quantity rises by 1.06 percent. Thus, the long-run rate of increase of the 
relative price of services to goods is roughly equal to the long-run rate of increase 
of their relative quantity. Section I earlier showed that, under the assumptions of 
equal sectoral factor income shares and proportionate wages—assumptions which 
are tolerably satisfied in the data38—the slope of the Roy supply curve equals 
− Θ L ξ/(1 +  Θ L ξ). Setting  Θ L equal to 2/3 and ξ to −0.75, one gets a slope of 1. 
As the Roy supply curve shows, there are bounds on the explanatory power of the 
Roy model. If ξ is to lie within its theoretical limit of −1, there must be a suffi-
cient movement of relative quantity and, more precisely, labor allocations relative to 
the observed sectoral relative price and (measured) productivity movements. Both 
this simple  back-of-the-envelope calculation and the more careful computations of 
Table 8 show that these movements exist.
The reported difference in goods and services productivity growth in the United 
States and the OECD is 0.8 and 1.4 percent per annum, respectively. Examining 
the values in Table 8 for ξ from −0.5 to −1, the range of defense spending-based 
 long-run elasticities found earlier, the adjusted difference ranges from +0.5 percent 
37 The Domar-weighted sum of sectoral reallocations is larger in the OECD 18 than in the United States alone, 
and hence eliminates a larger productivity gap with, interestingly, the same value of ξ.
38 In the US KLEMS the ln average annual wage per hour is 0.059 higher in goods, with an annual time trend 
of −0.0014 (0.0005). In the EU KLEMS, across 471 country × year observations ln relative goods wages are 
−0.084 lower than in services and, with country dummies, show an annual trend of 0.0052 (0.0004). Regarding 
factor shares, in the US KLEMS the average annual labor share in goods is 0.65, while in services it is 0.68, and 
their ln difference has an annual trend of −0.0039 (0.0005). Across the EU KLEMS, the average annual labor share 
in goods is 0.68 and in services is 0.64 and the ln difference, with country dummies, has an annual trend of 0.0002 
(0.0003).
Table 8—Average Private Sector Total Factor Productivity Growth with Roy Adjustments 
( Percent per annum)
United States 
(1987–2010, based on US KLEMS)
18 OECD countries 
(1970–2005, based on EU KLEMS)
ξ Goods Services Aggregate Goods Services Aggregate
   0.00
−0.25
−0.50
−0.75
−1.00
1.57
1.34
1.10
0.87
0.64
0.73
0.78
0.84
0.90
0.95
0.97
0.94
0.91
0.88
0.85
1.57
1.31
1.04
0.77
0.51
0.17
0.36
0.55
0.74
0.94
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.79
Notes: Goods, services, and aggregate calculated from BLS KLEMS and EU KLEMS 60-sector and 29-sector, 
respectively; gross output TFP measures using equation (16), with adjustments for bias as indicated by equation 
(15) earlier above.
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in favor of goods to +0.4 percent in favor of services. Thus, while it provides indica-
tions that the productivity growth gap between the two sectors is grossly overstated, 
this paper does not have a definitive point estimate to deliver to the reader. A value 
of ξ equal to −0.75, however, lies in the middle of the point estimates, and allows for 
the reinterpretation of historical productivity, price, and quantity data as represent-
ing a world in which true productivity growth in goods and services is roughly equal 
but Roy worker efficacy effects give rise to relative cost changes and the appearance 
of productivity growth differences. Thus, the “Roy supply curve” is a plausible, 
albeit not proven, explanation of the cost disease of services. This is the main point 
of this paper.
III. Conclusion
William Baumol’s cost disease of services has become part of the intellectual 
landscape of the profession, a truism taught, at least by this author, to generations 
of students. The profession, however, is also mindful of the fact that total factor 
productivity growth is a residual—Abramovitz’s (1956) famous “measure of our 
ignorance”—and has constantly sought new ways of explaining it. This paper fol-
lows a growing literature showing the role Roy’s model of self-selection amongst 
heterogeneous workers can play in explaining macroeconomic phenomena. It finds 
evidence in the relation between employment shares and measured productivity that 
average worker efficacy declines as a sector’s employment share increases, system-
atically biasing standard measures of productivity growth. While there is consider-
able uncertainty about the precise magnitude of these effects, the depiction of the 
relative supply of goods and services as being based upon equal goods and services 
productivity growth—with a rising relative cost brought about by an association 
between average worker efficacy and sectoral employment shares—is a plausible 
alternative characterization of developments in the United States and the OECD.
As noted by Jones (2002), barring the Great Depression and World War II, the 
growth of income per capita in the United States has been a remarkably steady 
2 percent per annum for more than 130 years, despite enormous structural changes 
in the US economy. Theoretically, it is difficult to think about this historical record 
in a framework in which aggregate economic growth is asymptotically drawn down 
to that of the slowest, most stagnant, sector. Practically, it is hard to sustain a fear of 
prospective stagnation in the face of such a lengthy retrospective history of constant 
growth. The alternative view—that, by and large, a rising tide of technology raises 
all boats (industries), while changes in relative prices simply reflect movements 
along a standard classroom concave production possibilities frontier—provides an 
easier way to think about the past history and future prospects of the US economy.
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